How do institutional reforms work at a micro-level? I collected and digitised individual-level data on thousands of entrants to the British Civil Service from 1864-1875. I study an 1870 reform that forced exam-based hiring on a large part of, but not all, the public sector. Patronage use declined among treated organisations but remained an important hiring procedure. I consider the extent of compliance both across- and within-organisations. The degree of compliance was determined by the organisations’ perception of examinations as a measure of future skill in the role. Organisations with more routine labour functions adopted examinations, those without did not. Political bargaining power appears to be pivotal in allowing non-routine organisations to evade legislation due to the presence of grey areas in the original reform.

How do pandemics affect medical demand? To study this, I combine district-level vaccination and mortality data from British India before, during, and after the 1918 influenza pandemic to study how pandemics affect medical demand in a developing nation. Districts worse affected by the pandemic report lower vaccinations, but only among young children. These differences disappear after three years. This demand shift is unrelated to either demographic or state capacity changes brought by the pandemic. I provide additional evidence suggesting that households reallocated resources in response to a short-term income shock, rather than changing their underlying attitudes to vaccination.